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Summary
The question of modernization remains a major issue in the mind of Asia’s civiliza-
tions, and is related to basic questions of identity. Unlike some late developing west-
ern nations that have participated in it as part of the process of the expansion of
Europe, and have therefore welcomed it as part of the inevitable process of change
and progress, on the whole, the nations of Asia have been much more ambiguous in
their appreciation of the “blessings” of modernization and their frequently dubious
consquences. In some cases, it has been viewed merely as a regrettable necessity, and
pursued with the requisite amount of vigour, while in other cases, it has been em-
braced only because the alternatives appeared so unpalatable. Lack of sensitivity to
this issue constantly bedevils relations between the nations of Asia and the west, nor
does it show any signs of diminishing, in spite of education, Asian Studies
programmes in the west, and continuing commercial intercourse, tourism and ex-
panding media information.
This paper will, in the course of dealing with a number of issues, argue that in spite
of their great differences, the Japanese and Chinese approaches to modernization
have much in common, and that the differences lie not so much in historical timing as
in the way in which western ideas were adopted and adapted in terms of traditional
cultural patterns. The differences only begin to show once economic growth com-
mences, with China returning quickly to its instinctive mercantile way of thinking.
Both, however, still, consciously or unconsciously, manifest an ambiguous attitude
towards the circumstances into which they were forced, and both express the same
dismay when western nations make assumptions and harbour expectations that seem
neither desirable nor justifiable. It is here that bedrock differences between the cul-
tures of Asia and the west begin to show, on matters of law and order, human rights,
democracy, and shared wealth. These issues have now become public currency
through the actions and expressed opinions of many of Asia’s new leaders. This is all
part of the modern genealogy of modernization.
Introduction : The Problem of Modernization in Asian Perspective
The question of modernization remains a major issue in the mind of Asia’s civiliza-
tions, and is related to basic questions of identity.1) Unlike some late developing west-
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Europe, and have therefore welcomed it as part of the inevitable process of change
and progress, on the whole, the nations of Asia have been much more ambiguous in
their appreciation of the “blessings” of modernization and their consequences. In
some cases, it has been viewed merely as a regrettable necessity, but nevertheless
pursued with vigour, while in other cases, it has been embraced only because the
alternatives appeared so unpalatable. Lack of sensitivity to this issue constantly be-
devils relations between the nations of Asia and the west, nor does it show any signs
of diminishing, in spite of education, Asian Studies programmes in the west, and
continuing commercial intercourse, tourism and media information.
As a general premise, it would not be incorrect to say that modernization was
forced, directly or indirectly, on Asia, by western nations, because of the technologi-
cal developments that came in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. These gave
western nations ironclad steam ships and powerful weaponry to which Asians had no
answer.
In the case of awakening Japan, it was the sufferings of China which served as a
warning, when China became the object of western predators, in the 19th century,
after the rejection of the McCartney Mission to Beijing in 1789.2) The United States
began to pressure Japan to open her doors to the west, in 1853, even before the U.S.
herself had faced the trauma of modernization that lay in the background of the Civil
War.3) The U.S. had become politically modernized in 1776, at the time of the Revo-
lution, much in the same way as the U.K. moved to a Constitutional Monarchy some
time before technological change prompted the developments that the French came to
describe as an “Industrial Revolution”. While the U.S. clearly possessed a techno-
logical advantage over Japan, the country was itself lagging behind in other areas of
social and economic development, and, like all pre-modernized societies, was still
predominantly based upon an agricultural economy. The appearance alone, however,
of overwhelming naval superiority, convinced a sufficient number of Japanese that
change was necessary, indeed inevitable.
Presumably, neither Americans nor Japanese had considered more deeply whether
the U.S.A. could maintain sustained pressure on Japan. Nevertheless, fear of the
European nations was real and unimagined, and cancelled out any illusions Japan
may have had of successfully resisting western overtures across the Pacific.
The focus of this paper is not upon the historical process by which the moderniza-
tion of Japan and China was accomplished. Documentation exists in abundance.4) It is
concerned primarily with the interpretation of the process, a hermeneutical rather than
historiographical study, paying attention to attitudes behind actions, because actions
usually speak louder than words. I shall commence with some observations on Japan
before moving to China, and finally to some comparative comments and conclusions
based upon observations of attitudes seen elsewhere in Asia.
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The western world has suffered, since the Industrial Revolution, from a form of
narcissism engendered by the belief that technological superiority is the ultimate, if
not the only form of superiority. The prevalent attitude towards Asia, as it has been
towards everywhere that colonization has taken place, is that local people should
show gratitude to the west for the benefits of enlightened civilization. Perhaps it is a
kind of revisionism that proposes a different interpretation of events, but evidence
seems to abound that the Asian embrace of the west was involuntary, unwelcome,
and judged to be no more than a necessary evil to be endured for the sake of survival,
since the alternatives were unthinkable, especially, for example, to a race such as the
Japanese.
Japan’s negative 17th century response to Western advances in the form of Roman
Catholic missionaries was praised by Immanuel Kant in his Essay on Perpetual
Peace, one of the finest pieces of writing on the subject.5) He argued that the disrup-
tion of society was too great a price to be paid for questionable benefits. Considering
the circumstances of the time in which he lived, it is interesting that he was quite
familiar with the event and that he could take a positive attitude towards it. The key to
the change in attitude was of course the technological factor combined with the
awareness that western civilizations were able to dismiss China at will, in spite of her
size and apparent power. To avoid such a fate, and to prepare Japan to withstand any
future pressures, change was accepted as the only means to survival The Shogunate
became aware of its own lack of credibility as potential leader for the new age, and
surrendered to a rival group that used the symbol of a restored Imperial sovereign as
their imprimatur, a device of Japanese politics as old as the the Nara period. The rest,
is indeed history.
The main point being made in this discussion is to point out the ambiguity that
existed from the beginning towards the need for modernization. It is highly doubtful if
belief in the “superiority” of western culture ever really existed. It was respected and
it was studied. Where necessary it was copied. The three famous slogans of the Meiji
period sum up the complexity of attitudes. The “Civilization and Enlightenment”, (文
明開化) pro-western movement, was challenged by the “Reverence the Emperor:
Expel the Barbarians” (尊王壌夷). The compromise was expressed in “ Western tech-
niques: Japanese Spirit” (和魂洋才). It is usually interpreted as meaning that the Japa-
nese were trying to combine something Japanese with their imported learning. I think
this fails to grasp the conflict it expressed, and the overwhelming desire not to lose
traditional cultural characteristics in the process of importing the means necessary for
national defence and survival.
One dimension of the genealogy of modernization that remains to the present is this
ambiguity. While debated less in academic circles, which often reflect western influ-
ences, it appears to have gained some recognition is the writings of non-academics,
popularizers and, indeed, amongst Asian politicians and businessmen. These people
represent various Asian countries, Japan, included, but also the “Little Dragons”, and
(270)
4more recently, Malaysia, under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Of this we shall
speak later, but awareness of this ambiguity, as I have described it, is one key to
interpreting Asian attitudes that frequently puzzle western diplomats and business-
men in particular. Access to the underlying attitudes cannot be found in surveys or
reference books, but in the unverbalized behaviour that indicates a quite different
stance from that which outsiders might have expected to encounter.
One of the interesting features of Japanese literature since the Meiji period, culmi-
nating in the death of Mishima Yukio, has been the struggle to integrate and interpret
the meaning of modernization and its implications for Japanese culture and society.6)
That this has been such a large theme indicates the degree to which the problem has
been internalized in the Japanese psyche. In popular culture, very much a thermom-
eter of popular consciousness and tastes, the endless production of costume dramas,
and soap versions such as Mito Kom¯on, or the forty-eighth Torasan movie in 1995,
alike suggests deep longings that are more than a passing nostalgia. If we compare the
analogous situation in the United States, the American Western frontier movie is al-
most a dead genre. Clint Eastwood’s Unforgiven kept it alive for one more genera-
tion, but it is clear that the romanticization of that period is over, and that should
anything remain, it will be a more realistic representation of the past than most previ-
ous versions have been. This in itself underlines one enormous difference in attitudes
towards the past. The west can discard its past. Japan, at many levels has sought to
preserve it. It took an Australian, Mel Gibson, to find a historical theme, in the form of
the 13th century freedom fighter and patriot, Sir William Wallace of Scotland, around
which to create a movie. For the local people of Stirling, history, legend, castle and
town are for tourists. There is little attempt, as there is in Japan, to preserve and main-
tain the past in such an elaborate and systematic way.7)
This does not mean that, simpliciter Japanese are obsessed with the past, and west-
erns do not care at all about it. Perhaps because of time, or because of an obsessive
fascination with scientific culture, the west adjusted more quickly to the changes that
led to the emergence of industrial society. It is considered natural that even good
traditions may be sacrificed in the name of “progress”. Japan, like China, maintained
its rural culture, and in that respect, these societies differ radically from the west.
They embraced change, but with a totally different agenda in mind. Observing
China’s struggle in the 20th century helps to reconstruct something of what the Japa-
nese were facing in the Meiji period since the experiences were inherently similar,
namely a life and death struggle for survival.
It has become more common since the 1980s to hear Japanese politicians and bu-
reaucrats advocating a clearer and more decisive leadership role for Japan in world
affairs, particularly in Asia. Sometimes this is referred to as revisionism, but it is a
strange state of affairs that a sovereign state such as Japan should be so heavily depen-
dent upon the United States in so many areas. The pre-war outlook of former Prime
Minister Nakasone, who claimed, in his inaugural lecture as President of Takushoku
University, that little Japan took on the white colonial powers on behalf of Asia is
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military machine, nor by most Japanese who feel that their government totally mis-
lead them. But there is a sense in which the very resistance of which he speaks of
represents the ambiguity I have identified. His pre-war ultra-nationalist stance is well
known, but is nevertheless indicative of some deeper outlook that is not confined to
his sanitized view of history.
Ishihara Shintaro’¯s The Japan that can say ‘No’ 8) is perhaps a better example of
what I am trying to identify. I am suggesting that the so called “revisionism” is not
merely a delayed reaction to U.S. presence since 1945, although that in part might
explain some aspects of the form it takes. Rather I am seeing it as the late 20th century
manifestation of the ambiguity towards western culture that has existed, at least, since
the Meiji period.
Perhaps it is appropriate to discuss Ishihara’s first work at this point. The book was
published originally in Japanese, and was a dialogue with Chairman Morita Akio of
Sony Corporation. According to Ishihara, when an unoffocial and inaccurate transla-
tion, (which he attributes to the Pentagon) went into circulation, he thought an official
version should come out in the U.S.A. For reasons of business diplomacy, Morita
dropped out of the project, and Ishihara continued alone. The end product is enig-
matic and quite difficult to evaluate. It is clearly emotional, filled with assertions
based on hearsay, second hand comments, unverified anecdotes and unreferenced
sources. It could be classified as journalism that is no more than the product of a
writer’s imagination. That would be the easy option. But Ishihara was a politician as
well. He had experience in the real world, and did express some of his published his
opinions to his U.S. counterparts. Therefore he does deserve a hearing. But how does
one assess that kind of a book?
The answer, I think, has to be to recognize that the whole work is simply a monu-
ment to precisely the kind of ambiguity of attitude of which I am speaking. Perthaps a
few quotations would be enough to explain how the ideas are expressed.
“During my meetings with politicians in Washington, I said, “I admit that Cauca-
sians created modern civilization, but what bothers me is that you seem to think that
heritage makes you superior. In the thirteenth century, the Mongols under Genghis
Khan and his successors overran Russia and eastern Europe, reaching almost to
Vienna and Venice. Mongol armies destroyed every army and fortress in their path,
plundering and raping. Caucasians adopted Mongol style haircuts and shaved eye-
brows, and even the Mongols’ bandy-legged gait. Just as Orientals of today are crazy
about the clothing and hairstyles of the Beatles, Michael Jackson, and Sting, Occiden-
tals of Genghis Khan’s time copied Mongolian ways. Even women liked the new
styles.””
Thus far, he makes a fair point about how cultural influences go back and forward.
But the sting is in the tail. In the following paragraph he says:
“Eventually, the Mongol Empire disintegrated, but some people trace Western fear
of Asians— the concept of the yellow peril— to the slaughter and pillage committed
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Now he is on questionable grounds, historically at least. But his final statement
becomes a severe judgement based on these assumed and semi-imaginative premises.
“Whatever the reason, Japanese should not forget that Caucasians are prejudiced
against Orientals.”9)
This passage demonstrates precisely what I have argued. He recognizes the role of
the west in creating the modern world, but has a very obvious love-hate attitude to-
wards it. Reference to the Mongols is ironic in that they became the only Chinese
dynasty that ever threatened Japan. In this respect, he is showing a kind of Asian
solidarity, but at the same time, drawing the lines of racial prejudice somewhat too
firmly and rigidly.
In contrast to this type of rhetoric, he frequently insists that Japan and the U.S.A.
have too much to lose by not co-operating. For example, he comes to almost an oppo-
site point of view when he argues:
“With the end of modernism, Japanese and Americans are like the explorers in the
Age of Discovery: uncertain but intrepid, scanning the horizon for signs of the new
age. We must travel lightly on this journey, discarding useless possessions like na-
tional stereotypes and prejudice. And for a safe passage, we need the beacon of a close
equal partnership.”10)
Once again, the ambiguity is shown very clearly. Ishihara’s book produced varied
reactions and considerable controversy. Some Japanese agreed with him, while others
were suspicious of his Asia “tilt”,11) doubtless harbouring the feeling that he was
returning to the pre-war doctrine of Japan standing alone against the white menace.
Neither view, of course, is without justification as an interpretation of his words. No
amount of further quotations will add weight to either one side or the other, simply
because the entire text is riddled with ambiguity and inconsistency. This fact has been
used to dismiss him as an eccentric. The reason that none of the standard interpreta-
tions is adequate is because they assume that he must be expressing a consistent view.
However, Ishihara is more like an angry man shouting at the wind. In this case, it is
the wind of modernization, which in one regard he respects both for what it is in itself,
and for how Japan handled it. But he rejects the western assumptions of superiority
that accompany it, assumptions that are still deeply embedded in the western ap-
proach at different levels. In this respect, he is correct in identifying and separating
them from modernization as a universally occurring process. This distinction has
been difficult for westerns to draw, and that is why Ishihara has been easy prey. But
Ishihara’s reaction is not unknown, elsewhere, and at other times. When the Highland
crofters of 18th century Scotland were being driven off their land and dumped uncer-
emoniously on the banks of the St. Lawrence, upon what became for them Nova
Scotia, the first ominous signs of industrialized agriculture were being seen. The same
ambiguous feelings and the same danger was felt. Those left in Scotland retreated into
a rigid Calvinism of the elect that became, in effect, a form of xenophobia. Two gen-
erations on, the taste for romanticism for a lost past took hold. This is not too far from
(267)
7the Japanese experience, and makes sense because it is the same issue of what hap-
pens when a technologically superior civilization tries to impose its breed of indus-
trial and ecomomic rationality on a less developed neighbour. Ishihara would have
had many sympathizers in 18th century Scotland.
II. The Modernization of China and the Western World
If we look at the work of Sun Yat-Sen and later of Mao Zedong, it becomes even
clearer than in the case of Japan, as we come closer to the present, that the basic
strategy was devised in the interests of the preservation and development of China,
and that anything western was being adopted and adapted for that purpose.
When Mao declared that the People’s Republic of China had come into being in
1949, for the first time in its history, China, the world’s oldest continuous civilization,
had become, at last, the world’s largest single country. Authentic nationhood had
escaped it for centuries, although something called the Central Kingdom had always
existed. In 1949, it had a new birth and a new identity. Mao and his colleagues had
three priorities above all else. First was to secure the borders of the country, once and
for all, and to establish territorial integrity. In this, he was successful, although it was
left to his sucessor, Deng Xiaoping to initiate the process that would lead to the return
of Hong Kong to Chinese rule. The thorny issue of Taiwan could not be forced in
Mao’s time, and even Deng showed caution. It would appear that economic interests
may settle this issue in due course, once the generation change is complete. Territorial
integrity was the first priority.
Secondly, there was the need to close all frontiers to foreign inteference. Following
the failure of the Manchu Emperors to prevent foreign incursions and the disastrous
post-1911 Revolution period when the Nationalists and the Japanese were moving
armies freely across the country, he was determined, as were his colleagues to close
the country, at least for a period, to establish order and growth within. Finally, he
worked for the ideological supremacy of the communist party (as he defined commu-
nism, rather than as defined by Marx or the U.S.S.R.) He took upon himself the role of
Guardian supreme. Mao Zedong was the only person permitted to write poems, hith-
erto a national and cultural pastime. Like the guardian in Plato’s Republic, he was a
person who suffers a great deal, is in many ways deprived, isolated, overloaded with
responsibility but deeply committed to his task. This was the role Mao Zedong had to
play.
Why did he become Marxist? What was his understanding of Marxism? How did
he see Marxism helping China?12) These questions have been the subject of many
theses and discusions. Mao Zedong was labelled, in keeping of the U.S. categoriza-
tion of all social and political systems, as a communist. But in truth, beneath it all was
a Confucian philosophy with a strong puritan streak. It was a Confucian type of com-
munism, directed, not to the down-trodden industrial masses, who did not as yet exist,
but to agricultural peasants. In this, it espoused the cause of China rather than seeing
itself as “international”. There may have been an early enthusiasm for the Soviet
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ration for the Revolution was Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, claimed as spiritual leader by both
Mao Zedong and the Kuomintang under Jiang Jie Shi.
The Cultural Revolution is the one exception to what has been argued. Mao, or
whoever else was masterminding the movement, tried to carry it to extremes, with the
apparent intent of weakening those aspects of traditional culture that stood in the way
of development. Many absurd programs were initiated, such as the day of the removal
of sparrows, or the pulling up of grass and lawns. More focussed was the abolition of
family graves and funerals. This was a clear and thoughtful assault on ancestral rever-
ence. But it failed ultimately, and Mao himself is now, amongst other things, a guard-
ian deity of road safety. Traditional culture, in Asia, is difficult to suppress.13)
What is the key to understanding Chinese postures in the later decades of the 20th
century? No more and no less than that the agenda of 1949 is still prority. President
Richard Nixon’s relationship with China and that of Sir Edward Heath, the British
Prime Minister, was based on a respect for this understanding of what China was
attempting to achieve,14) although both reserved the right to their own judgements of
events.
Deng’s “socialism with a Chinese face” grew from two principles. One was that the
Cultural Revolution had actually diverted energy from the real agenda of 1949, for a
mythical vision. Secondly, he was deeply aware of the resilience of traditional culture
and of the need not only to accommodate it, but to utilize it in the development of the
country and the economy. This set China back on course, but implicitly, began both
the rapprochment, and the confrontation, with the west.
III. The Modernization of Asia and the “Little Dragons”
After reviewing Japan and China we can see how interest begins to emerge in what
might be called as Asian evaluation of modernization, one which has more recently
brought Asians into conflict with the west, and has seen the emergence of western-
style Asian diplomats and leaders, speaking firmly, however, for the Asian cause.
Two outstanding examples are Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad
of Malaysia.
The importance of these men will be judged in the future, but Lee’s profound influ-
ence remains unequalled in making the case for an Asia that makes up its own mind.
Lee’s influence in Asia is well known, as is his independence of mind. His major
writings contain numerous statements which underline precisely the same ambiguous
attitude towards the west as we have found in Ishihara. There is respect for techno-
logical advance, but, in the case of Lee, almost a scathing disrepect for the western
world which he views as limited in its capacity to serve as any kind of model for Asia.
In an interview with Time magazine, Lee offered some comparative observations on
Eastern and Western approachs to democracy and Human Rights.
“I don’t think that Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore wish to view the United
States of America or any European nations as a model. No society abandons its tradi-
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have by trial and error, and if it benefits both society and the economy, they may adopt
it. I don’t think that any Asian society wishes to copy the American system. Person-
ally, having observed Americans, I am amazed that the country has survived 200
years. Only the Philippines has adopted the U.S. model, and that is a bad model for
Asia.”15)
He also makes the point that the selfish individualism of the western world is not a
value that is either shared or respected by Asian cultures.
“Human Rights are another problem in Asia. Whether a society is in a golden age
scenario, or in total chaos, the individual is never valued above society. Society is
always valued as more important that the individual.”16)
As a direct consequence of this outlook, he has also been a stout and consistent
critic of western attacks on China. He has warned pro-democracy activists in Hong
Kong that democracy is a luxury that some rich countries can afford, but not China
and certainly not until the three issues of concern, identified earlier, have been re-
solved satisfactorily. Consequently, in a 1995 Los Angeles Times interview, he
warned critics of China in the U.S. not to raise the stakes over Taiwan. He pointed out
that it was a delicate issue, and that the west had really no right to interfere, and
further could precipitate an international crisis through reckless thinking. Singapore
itself was criticised by many Americans over the use of a bamboo cane to punish a
young offender who had been warned about his behaviour, and who happened to be a
U.S. citizen. The government refused to change the sentence, and the punishment was
carried out. This attitude is an expression of Lee’s philosophy of social discipline.
Every country, he argues, places different value upon the concept of Human Rights.
Mahathir Mohamad is the third outspoken critic of the west, whose comments are
less defences of Asia so much as rejection of most western values. He is critical of the
inability of the west to recognize the intrinsic value of Asian thinking, and at the
aggressive way in which the western nations have imposed their systems on Asia.
“The West has a long history of aggressive wars fought in an ongoing campaign to
westernize the world: no Asian country has ever invaded another country to
“Easternize” it. The notion that a country must Westernize in order to modernize is
ludicrous. Asian modernization occurred as an inevitable stage in our own history, not
because we were Europeanized or Americanized. For Westerners to think that we
cannot make progress unless we become like them is absurd.”16)
This passage expounds the heart of his position. He attributes the decline of the
West to the same hedonism that Lee identifies. He also condemns: the misunderstand-
ing of the meaning of the term and ideal of “democracy”:
“When devotion to a pedantic notion of democracy results in economic stagnation,
high unemployment, the denial of the right to work and work hard, the protection of
neo-fascists, or the empowering of a vocal minority of political activists over the
silent majority of ordinary citizens, then it is time to ask whether the ideal is being
perverted. Democratic fanatics are no better than religious fanatics; neither can see
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the wood for the trees. In any case, to Asians, democracy does not confer a license for
citizens to go wild . . . ”17)
One further controversial element in Mahathir’s thought is his view of Japan,
which is based on Japan’s post-World War II record. He goes so far as to predict that
“with Japan leading the way, (East Asia) will continue to drive the world economy
and play an increasingly global role in the coming century.”18)
This approach to East-West issues is now to be found at many levels, and not just
that of outspoken political leaders. It can be found, for example, in the further grow-
ing debate about modernization and its implications for Asian styles of business man-
agement, illustrating further that mere copying of the west never was basic to the
agenda of these nations.
The popular magazine Asian Business has in recent times devoted much space to
the issue of what is Asian Management.
“Managers in the 21st century will also understand the need to . . . find common
threads and mutual ground that will support corporate goals across many cultures. In
capitalist Japan and communist China, leaders have recognised this. The Japanese
refer to wakon yos¯ai— Japanese spirit and Western learning, Japan’s success was
based on a committment to learn from outsiders. The Chinese have another dictum—
Chinese learning as base, Western science and business methods as application. Both call
for what each society would consider a ‘best practice’; both result in modernisation.
What is “Asian best practice’? It is our sense of responsibility to our community,
the positive side of paternalism associated with Asian companies. If we can sustain
this, our management styles will be based on respect for the communities in which we
operate. All else will follow.”
The author then makes reference to a Hong Kong academic in support of his views:
“Gordon Redding, professor of management studies at the University of Hong
Kong School of Business, believes that all economic systems are embedded in a cul-
ture that is defined as a set of values. The cultures which cope best with modernisation
are those that blend the rational values of modernisation with their own values to
maintain co-operation within organisations.”19)
Bernardo Villegas, Dean of the School of Economics at the University of Manila,
made a similar point that “It is up to enlightened leaders to devise appropriate eco-
nomic policies that make the culture’s strengths productive”. He was critical of the
1960’s Harvard theorists who wrote off South Korea, but praised Myanmar and the
Philippines, and how they were totally wrong in doing so. He then takes up the issue
of “Confucian cultures” being responsible for growth, Japan and Singapore being
cited, in contrast to the older view that it was Confucianism that was holding China in
feudalism. This in course calls for a further review of the Weberian thesis about eco-
nomic growth and development. However, while Dean Villegas may be a good
economist, he does not even define either “culture” or “Confucianism” clearly, but
presumably assumes that there are agreed meanings. In fact, while rejecting cultural
theories, he actually admits they have credibility:
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“A careful look at the historical evidence in Asia, therefore, leads to the conclusion
that culture per se neither hinders nor helps economic development. That is not to say
culture is irrelevant.
But the success of some Confucian countries demonstrates only that particular cul-
tures have particular strengths. Systems and policies which take these into account
can accelerate economic development, even to ‘miraculous’ rates of growth.”20)
These assorted views should be enough to substantiate the overall argument about
the view of modernization and development that is currently growing in Asia.
Lee Kwan Yew perhaps might have the last word here in summarising the issue
raised in this section:
“For Asian countries, the issue is not not to copy America, Britain or any European
nation’s constitution. For them, they simply wish to live in a secure, ordered society
and enjoy a growing standard of living.”21)
IV. Roots of Western Misunderstanding
One of the basic and underlying problems of western observers and commentators,
as a whole, is that they are usually commenting from dubious premises, premises that
presuppose the old Euro-centric view of the world. These run something as follows,
although they are never made explicit in quite this form, but they can be detected quite
easily in both attitudes and statements.
“The west is the source of modern progressive civilization, of scientific and tech-
nological culture. Since the 19th century, the west has been conferring its religious
blessings and economic benefits upon the unenlightened nations of the world, giving
them education, literacy, hospitals, and modern institutions, such as democracy, and
free markets. Modernization is the process by which these benefits are acquired, and
since these are the greatest prizes in the world, naturally, all nations wish to have
them. Thus, modernization is really little more than the rest of the world copying the
west and trying to catch up. They should all be grateful for these benefits and should
listen when the west offer advice.”22)
Like most observers, I have heard this theme many times in different forms. It is
most usually claimed of Africa and South America. Asia is sometimes given a little
more credit for its own development, but the superciliousness remains. I would con-
tend, strongly, that while to the west these are blessings beyond doubt, to the Asian
world, they were never unambiguously welcomed. As has been noted by some critics,
modernization in Asia has meant three things, namely Christianity, crime and veneral
disease. The Chinese and Japanese had literacy before the west came gate-crashing
other civilizations. Traditional medicine, for example, worked well. But in terms of
technology, these nations were weak. Modernization was conceived of not so much as
desirable, but as regrettably necessary. To the west it was progress. To Asia, it meant
disruption, discontinuity and change.23)
But the West must examine its own record, and in particular the record of failure in
social policy, particularly since the 1980s. The High Priestess in the West of the idea
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that the individual is the ultimate reality, and that society is a mere aggregate of indi-
viduals, a leading criticism of the West by all Asians quoted, was former British
Prime Minister Thatcher. Her theme was stated nowhere more clearly than when she
visited the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1988, when it met in the
Assembly Halls on the Mound in Edinburgh. Not inapproriately, it was dubbed, quite
sarcastically, “The Sermon on the Mound”, and was viewed by many observers as a
direct threat to the “Scottish philosophical and theological conviction that to be hu-
man means to have a social identity as persons in community. “This” as one critic put
it “is being shaken by the conviction that, in Mrs. Thatcher’s tell-tale phrase, there is
no such thing as society, only competitive, property-owning individuals regulated by
an amoral market and an absolute state.”24) This clear and unambiguous denunciation
of Thatcher is perhaps also a gentle rejoinder to the Ishihara / Mahathir attack on
Christianity as one source of the Western attitude towards Asia. Perhaps some kinds
of Christianity fit their description. There are those, with a social conscience, that do
not.
I have alluded to some of the assumptions made about Asia that lead to misunder-
standing and misinformed comment. Professor Maurice J. Meisner25) points to an-
other and more recent source of misunderstanding which affects China specifically,
but which belongs to the same syndrome. He enunciated it in a 1995 article in the Los
Angeles Times.
“The waves of Sinophobia that have swept over the United States and the West are
not entirely due to the suppression of the 1989 democracy movement. The Tian An
Men Square massacre was, of course, repulsive, but it suggested a Chinese govern-
ment that was weak and unpopular— inspiring contempt more than fear. Rather,
Western fears of China began in earnest only in 1993— when the World Bank calcu-
lated that China’s economy was the world’s third largest, and was growing most
rapidly.
Fears were intensified when CIA analysts estimated that China had replaced Japan
as the world’s second-largest economic power and projected that the Chinese
economy would surpass in size that of the United States within a generation.”
The natural fear of economic power translating into military power, and this has
fuelled fears of China. But as Meisner argues:
“The threat of Chinese expansionism has been greatly exaggerated. Neither in
rhetoric not deed is there any indication that Beijing seeks territories other than those
historically part of China.”26)
The sentiments described have been compounded by articles in Fortune 27) and in
the Harvard Business Review 28) describing the scale of growth in Asia, and the world-
wide network of Chinese business. It seems that some centres of thought in the west
are unhappy about ceasing to be number one in size. To them the answer must be thus.
“If you stimulate growth in the interests of creating markets, you create wealth.
Wealth can be translated, initially into power, and subsequently into independence”.
It puts a new economic slant on words attributed to Napoleon. “Let China sleep.
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When China awakes, the world will tremble”. It underlines another point missd by
western promoters of growth and development. Once a country or culture embarks on
the road to modernization, the outcome cannot be either predicted or controlled by
outside forces. This principle does not yet seem to be have been widely understood.
Concluding Observations on Economic Success and Modernization
It is hard to resist the conclusion that overall, Asian nations’ “controlled” or “man-
aged” modernization, in the style, for example, of Lee Kwan Yeuw in Singapore, or
MITI in Japan, has helped to increase wealth, but in a way that generates social stabil-
ity and not social unrest because of discontent over disparity of wealth.
The pragmatic humanism of the Asia tradition seems to have coped well with the
stresses on traditional system that modernization brings. Unlike western nations that
tend to abandon almost everything traditional that appears to stand in the way of
“progress”, Asian nations have preferred to maintain much of their past while devel-
oping modern features. Singapore and Malaysia’s legal penalties for drug-related of-
fences by western standards of judgement, may seem excessive, but those countries
eschew lawlessness, and have no desire to be swamped by crime waves so common in
the west, and often assumed there to be the inevitable result of social change. Simi-
larly, China’s record on Human Rights may likewise seem oppressive, but if public
order means the avoidance of a civil war involving one and a half billion people,
something that would shake the world, and not just Asia, then China’s leaders can act
only as they see fit, and “manage” the pace of change accordingly.
Japan’s market opening is another instance of “managed” development. It will
come, when the domestic situation is stable enough to handle the consequences. This
frustrates and angers westerns who expect, indeed, almost will, that all their woes will
be replicated in Asia, so that these conditions will “level the playing fields”. It will
most likely not happen like that. Neither Japan nor Singapore, least of all China, will
acceede to these kinds of pressures. Recent western critics are now complaining that
gaiatsu (外圧), in terms of Rosenberg’s thesis on Japan’s economic and trading sys-
tem, is not working any more. The point is that it probably never did. It merely
seemed to work when its exertion co-incided with circumstances where Japan had
elected to change because all the preparatory groundwork had been completed, and
the system had been sufficiently insulated to bear any unexpected shock.
The principal point to emerge here should be that Asia has moved into a new phase,
in which the nations of Asia are now managing their ongoing modernization and de-
velopment as they see fit. They may feel a debt to the west for initiating the process.
But the west no longer functions as either a model or an ideal, if indeed, it ever did
except in the minds of westerns themselves. To maintain peace and stability in the
modern world calls for a more sympathetic appreciation of the Asian tradition on the
part of the west, and more intra-Asian interaction on the basis of equality and mutual
respect. This is the challenge for the coming generation.
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Notes
1) There is a disturbing failure to recognize how deeply the issue of modernization in Asia is now
linked to local identity, and not to veneration of the west. Evidence of this is the procession of the
uninformed who reach the shores of Japan and China with little awareness of what to expect, and
who then protest and complain when they discover that the rules of engagement are different.
Western media prejudice has a lot of responsibility to bear, particularly on account of Japan-
bashing and China-bashing in recent years. Guilty also are the business schools that teach uni-
versal models for the world economy that take no account whatsoever of cultural diversity and
its role in shaping attiutudes towards the modernization or industrialization process.
2) The McCartney Mission is discussed most recently in two interesting works:
Aubrey Singer The Lion and the Dragon (Barrie & Jenkins, 1992), pp. 192.
Alan Peyrefitte The Collision of Two Civilisations (Harvill, 1992), pp. 630.
The rejection of the west by China was clear and unequivocal, a rejection for which China
paid dearly when British naval power reached its zenith and when the British Empire in the east
was being consolidated in the 19th century. Had China been ruled by a less decadent dynasty,
and a less closed attitude, subsequent disasters might have been avoided. It was this chain of
consequences that served as a warning, thus provoking change in Japan.
3) Compared to the ravages and slaughter of the Civil War in the United States of America, in
which an estimated two million Americans died, Japan’s Meiji Restoration resembles more a
bloodless palace coup. The Meiji Restoration was over by 1868. The American Civil War lasted
from 1861 to 1865, and therefore occurred only a short time before Japan underwent the same
modernization process. The erroneous image lingers, even amongst some academics, that
Japan’s encounter with the west only really began to happen after the Pacific War, with the
earlier encounters being discounted.
4) Among works consulted are the following which deal primarily with the historical aspects of the
modernization period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Frances W. Moulder Japan,
China and the Modern World Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1977); Kajima
Morinosuke The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 1895–1925 (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1968);
Black et al. The Modernization of Japan and Russia (Free Press, 1975); Ed. Marius B. Jansen
Changing Japanese Attituds towards Modernization (Princeton University Press, 1965); Craig
and Reischauer Japan: Tradition and Transformation (Miffin, Boston, 1973) William W.
Lockwood “Japan’s Response to the West: The Contrast with China” World Politics, Vol. IX,
Part I, October 1956 pp. 37–54.
5) Kant Essay on Perpetual Peace, 1795, (Liberal Arts Press, 1957) pp. 23–23.
6) Henry Scott Stokes The Life and Death of Yukio Mishima (The Noonday Press, 1995 edition).
The entire book deals with the theme of the problem of Japanese identity in the modernized
world.
7) Buruma, Ian A Japanese Mirror (Penguin Books, 1984). Chapter 10 in particular deals with this
theme, but the entire work is excellent.
8) Ishihara Shintaro ¯The Japan that can Say ‘No’ (Kod¯ansha Intenational, 1993).
9) op. cit. p. 27.
10) ibid. p. 127.
11) Kondo, Ken ICU Peace Research Institute, Peace Reports, Vo. 2, No. 1, December 1995, p. 1
and p. 9. The paper raises the long term question of ‘Asia or the West?’ and of the rise of an
“Asia-ism”. This issue requires further serious analysis.
12) Mao’s thought has been widely discussed and analysed. Zhou Enlai, in a report given at the First
National Youth Congress, and which was published in the People’s Daily on Octobert 8, 1978,
speaks of learning from Mao Zedong. The highly personalised and eccelctic nature of Mao’s
thought comes through. The revolutionary aspects of his approach have an affinity with Marx,
but many other elements are borrowed from the Chinese tradition and elsewhere.
13) Mao’s failure to end ancestor worship has resulted in himself being treated as a divinity after his
death, being used by taxi drivers in Beijing as a road-safety protector.
14) History will come to evaluate the importance of these two men in supporting China’s willininess
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to emerge from isolation, with assurances of co-operation and respect.
15) Lee Kwan Yew Forty Years of Political Discourses (Li Guang Yao Sishi Nian Zheng Xuan,
United Press, Singapore, 1995) pp. 581–2.
16) Mahathir Mohammad and Shintaro ¯Ishihara The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Com-
ing Century (Kod¯ansha International, Tokyo and New York, 1995) p. 77.
17) op. cit. p. 83.
18) op. cit. p. 132.
19) Asian Business Vol. 32, No. 1 January 1966 p. 38.
20) Asian Business Vol. 32, No. 3, March 1996 p. 16.
21) Li Guang Yao op. cit. p. 524.
22) Professor Emily S. Rosenberg gave a lecture at the International House of Japan, entitled
“Spreading ‘The American Dream’ to Asia” (IHJ Bulletin, Vol. 15. No. 1, Winter 1995) pp. 1–6,
which describes the subordination image of Asia learning from its master in the early part of the
20th century. As I have suggested, it has lingered much longer.
23) There was a major debate in Europe during summer 1996 about western paedophiliacs visiting
countries like Thailand, or the Philippines. The local cultures were criticised for permitting it.
Counter-arguments suggested that western nations might impose penalties on their nationals
arrested for such crimes. Similar issues are raised on the subject of the U.S. military and prosti-
tution, by Saundra Pollock Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. military in Asia
(New York, 1992). All these issues are side-effects of the entire colonial era.
24) William Storrar Scottish Identity : A Christian Vision (The Handsel Press, Edinburgh, 1990)
pp. 4–8, 179.
25) Meisner is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and author of The
Reign of Deng  Xiaoping: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism (Hill and Wang, 1996).
26) “Trying to Tame the Dragon: An Escalating Fear of China Complicated Already Complex
U.S.— Sino Relations”.
27) October 31, 1994.
28) “The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business” Harvard Business Review, (March-April 1993),
pp. 24–37.
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